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Note 
SECOND WIND:   
A LEGAL AND POLICY-BASED EVALUATION OF THE BLOCK ISLAND 
WIND FARM AND THE LEGISLATION THAT SAVED IT 
BRIAN M. GIBBONS 
Rhode Island has recently attempted to pioneer offshore wind energy 
development by passing new legislation and partnering with Deepwater 
Wind, LLC to develop a wind farm off Block Island.  This wind farm will 
have long-term implications, both as a demonstration project for future 
offshore wind energy, and as a paradigm for governmental expedition of 
renewable energy projects. 
In support of this project, Rhode Island passed aggressive new 
legislation that severely constrained the discretion of the Public Utilities 
Commission in deciding whether a contract between Deepwater Wind and 
National Grid was “commercially reasonable.”  The resulting controversy 
underscores the importance of maintaining competition between renewable 
energy firms in order to avoid allegations of favoritism and neglect of 
constituent ratepayers. 
This Note traces the still-developing history of the Block Island Wind 
Farm, along with its accompanying legal challenges, controversies, and 
stakeholder perspectives, in order to extract the lessons that can be applied 
in future renewable energy development.  The primary lesson that emerges 
is the political and economic price of circumventing the regulatory process 
through legislation that advantages one particular company. 
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SECOND WIND:   
A LEGAL AND POLICY-BASED EVALUATION OF THE BLOCK ISLAND 
WIND FARM AND THE LEGISLATION THAT SAVED IT 
BRIAN M. GIBBONS∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, Rhode Island has attempted to jumpstart offshore wind 
energy development by passing new legislation and partnering with 
Deepwater Wind, LLC to develop a wind farm approximately three miles 
southwest of Block Island.  This wind farm will have long-term 
implications as a model for future offshore wind farm development in the 
northeastern United States.  Deepwater Wind is already planning a “second 
generation” of large-scale offshore wind farms,1 and other companies may 
well decide to enter the market in the near future if the Block Island Wind 
Farm is successful. 
In 2009, the project stalled when the Rhode Island Public Utilities 
Commission (“PUC”) declared that the Power Purchase Agreement 
(“PPA”) between Deepwater Wind and distributor National Grid was not 
“commercially reasonable” in accordance with applicable legislation.2  In 
response, Rhode Island passed new legislation that redefined the term 
“commercially reasonable” and effectively forced the PUC to approve an 
updated, but nearly identical contract.3  Currently, the project is moving 
through the permitting process, and is expected to be completed in 2015.4 
The significantly higher cost of wind energy and the perceived 
favoritism to one company has made Rhode Island’s renewable energy 
policy widely controversial.  This Note explores the legal, legislative, and 
regulatory path the Block Island Wind Farm has traveled since its 
inception through present day.  It begins with a history of the Wind Farm 
in Part II, before delving into more intricate legal analysis in Part III.   
The Block Island Wind Farm itself is a relatively small, local project 
with short-term consequences that can be predicted and analyzed.  Part IV 
                                                                                                                          
∗ University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; Elon University, B.S. 2009; 
Block Island School, Valedictorian 2005. 
1 Deepwater Wind Energy Center, DEEPWATER WIND, http://dwwind.com/dww-energy-
center/deepwater-wind-energy-center-overview (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Deepwater 
Wind Energy Center]; Hudson Canyon Wind Farm, DEEPWATER WIND, http://dwwind.com/hudson-
canyon/hudson-canyon-project-overview (last visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
2 In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 492−93 (R.I. 2011). 
3 Id. at 494−96. 
4 Stephanie Turaj, Deepwater Completion Pushed to 2015, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Dec. 16, 2012), 
http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/deepwater-completion-pushed-to-2015/937011. 
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of this Note explores the immediately discernible costs and benefits of the 
project from the perspective of different stakeholders. 
Beyond the short-term consequences, the controversy and litigation 
surrounding the Block Island Wind Farm provide lessons applicable to 
future renewable energy development.  A crucial question is whether the 
Rhode Island government’s official sponsorship and aggressive, narrowly 
tailored legislation should serve as a model for other states.  The Note 
concludes by evaluating the policies underlying Rhode Island’s legislative 
and executive actions. 
II.  HISTORY OF THE DEEPWATER WIND BLOCK ISLAND WIND FARM 
The wind power initiative in Rhode Island began in January 2006, 
when then-Governor Donald Carcieri announced a plan to supply 15% of 
the state’s electricity demand from wind energy.5  Two years later, Rhode 
Island solicited proposals from private developers to construct, finance, 
and operate a large-scale offshore wind farm.6 
State officials selected Deepwater Wind in September 2008 to finance 
and build a wind farm.7  The company, which was only three-years old at 
the time, beat out six other wind energy developers to gain exclusive rights 
to develop a wind farm off the coast of Rhode Island.8  The company’s 
plans for Rhode Island involve two separate stages: (1) a five-turbine 
“demonstration-scale” wind farm located three miles southeast of Block 
Island;9 and (2) a much larger Deepwater Wind Energy Center, composed 
of 150 to 200 turbines located farther offshore, on the outer continental 
shelf approximately 30 miles east of Long Island, 15 miles southeast of 
Block Island, and 15 miles southwest of Martha’s Vineyard.10 
While Rhode Island has not contributed any funding for the project, it 
has worked to expedite the state and federal approval processes.11  Most 
crucial to Deepwater’s success were identical House and Senate bills that 
were signed into law by Governor Carcieri on June 26, 2009.12  The 
legislation, effective July 1, 2010, required electric distribution companies 
                                                                                                                          
5 Timothy C. Barmann, Change in the Wind, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 13, 2006, at F1. 
6 Timothy C. Barmann, Wind Farm Gathers Steam—Rhode Island Seeks Private Partner for 
Project, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 4, 2008, at F1. 
7 Timothy C. Barmann, N.J. Firm Picked to Build State’s Wind Farm, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 25, 
2008, at 1 [hereinafter Barmann, N.J. Firm Picked]. 
8 Id. 
9 Block Island Wind Farm, DEEPWATER WIND, http://dwwind.com/block-island/block-island-
project-overview (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
10 Deepwater Wind Energy Center, supra note 1. 
11 See Chris Barrett, Deepwater Moves Ahead with Wind Farm, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Jan. 26, 
2009), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Deepwater-moves-ahead-with-wind-farm-Five-
to-eight-turbines-would-power-the-entire-island/88890 (“The state will provide no funding for the 
project, but will help steer Deepwater through a host of state and federal approval processes.”). 
12 In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 489 (R.I. 2011). 
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to enter into long-term contracts to buy power from renewable energy 
developers, provided that the developer’s proposals were “commercially 
reasonable.”13  The law effectively gave Deepwater Wind a guaranteed 
buyer for its electric power.14 
Rhode Island’s largest electric utility company, National Grid, and 
Deepwater Wind settled upon a PPA in December 2009.15  But the PUC 
rejected the contract as not “commercially reasonable” under the 2009 
legislation.16   
In response, the Rhode Island General Assembly modified the 
applicable statute with additional legislation.17  Under the new version of 
the law, National Grid was specifically authorized to enter into a PPA on 
terms consistent with the (rejected) 2009 agreement.18  The legislation also 
delineated new factors for the Commission to apply in its review of an 
amended PPA—factors that were written specifically to strip the 
Commission of any authority to again reject the agreement.19  After taking 
into account the new legislation, the PUC approved the amended PPA in 
August 2010,20 and the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the 
PUC’s approval in July of 2011.21 
At the local level, Deepwater has gained approval for the 
implementation of necessary research equipment,22 and the Block Island 
Town Council has expressed support for the project in general.23  Most 
                                                                                                                          
13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-3(a) (Supp. 2012). 
14 Alex Kuffner, Law Clears Way for Wind, PROVIDENCE J., June 27, 2009, at 4.  
15 Alex Kuffner, Utility to Buy Wind Farm’s Electricity, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 10, 2009, at 1. 
16 In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 492−93. 
17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-7(c) (Supp. 2012) (detailing the definition of what is to be 
considered commercially reasonable); In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 494–
95 (noting that the General Assembly made amendments). 
18 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-7(a) (Supp. 2012). 
19 See id. § 39-26.1-7(c) (redefining “commercially reasonable” to “mean terms and pricing that 
are reasonably consistent with what an experienced power market analyst would expect to see for a 
project of similar size, technology, and location”).  Moreover, the modified law explicitly requires that 
the commission “shall approve” the PPA if it is “likely to . . . further development of Quonset Business 
Park [where Deepwater planned to build parts of the turbines]” and if “[t]he amended power purchase 
agreement is likely to provide environmental benefits, including the reduction of carbon emissions.”  
Id.  
20 In re Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett Elec. Co. & Deepwater 
Wind Block Island, 2010 WL 3458306, at *1 (R.I.P.U.C. Aug. 16, 2010). 
21 In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 486. 
22 Chris Barrett, Deepwater Seeks Weather Tower near North Light, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Feb. 
17, 2009), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Deepwater-seeks-weather-tower-near-North-
Light/88936. 
23 Dan West, Council Supports Wind Farm Bill, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (May 10, 2010), 
http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Council-supports-wind-farm-bill/90852; Dan West, 
Town Council Supports New Wind Contract, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (July 12, 2010), http://block-
island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Town-Council-supports-new-wind-contract/91175; Dan West, 
Council to Send Letter for Deepwater Loan Guarantee, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Sept. 20, 2010), 
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importantly, Deepwater Wind has received planning board and zoning 
board approval for the substation necessary to provide Block Island with 
electricity.24 
Deepwater still needs approval from the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, which recently extended its comment period through February 
10, 2013.25  The state Coastal Resources Management Council, is also 
considering a permit application and opened its comment period on 
November 15, 2012.26  In addition, Deepwater’s Environmental Report 
lists eleven other federal permits, seven other state permits, and three more 
local permits that are anticipated to be approved by the end of 2013.27 
Deepwater is also facing a new complaint filed by a Newport resident 
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”).  FERC 
recently issued a “notice of intent not to act” on the complaint, which will 
allow the petitioner to file a complaint in federal court.28 
Now that the basic history of the Block Island Wind Farm has been 
recounted, the following section will explore in considerably more detail 
the underlying legal issues, focusing primarily on energy and 
environmental concerns. 
III.  LEGAL ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 
The myriad legal issues involved in the development and approval of 
the Block Island Wind Farm are best divided into three categories:  (1) 
energy regulations, (2) environmental regulations, and (3) land use 
regulations.  This section will explore Deepwater’s ongoing journey 
through these various legal and regulatory hurdles, while simultaneously 
analyzing competing arguments and counterarguments. 
A.  Energy Regulation 
Deepwater Wind is fundamentally an energy company, with the 
ultimate goal of harnessing and selling wind energy for a profit.  As such, 
the construction and operation of the Block Island Wind Farm and the 
                                                                                                                          
http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Council-to-send-letter-for-Deepwater-loan-
guarantee/91542. 
24 Judy Tierney, Deepwater Substation Approved, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012), 
http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/deepwater-substation-approved/808215. 
25 Press Release, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Public Comment Period Extended to Feb. 10 on 
Deepwater Wind Proposal to Build Wind Turbines off Block Island Coast (Dec. 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/news/12/2012-127.pdf. 
26 Pippa Jack, CRMC Opens Comment Period for Deepwater Wind, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Nov. 
19, 2012), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/crmc-opens-comment-period-for-deepwater-
wind/927367. 
27 DEEPWATER WIND, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT/CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIONS PLAN 1-8 to 
1-9 (2012), available at http://dwwind.com/docs/Environmental%20Report.pdf. 
28 Riggs v. R.I. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 141 FERC ¶ 61033 (2012). 
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Deepwater Wind Energy Center are governed by myriad energy laws and 
regulations.  Deepwater’s greatest legal challenge has come at the state 
level of energy regulation, where two pieces of new legislation were 
needed to force the Block Island Wind Farm into Rhode Island’s 
regulatory scheme.29 
At the federal level, the Federal Power Act only authorizes the federal 
government to regulate the sale of electricity in interstate commerce.30  
Since only electricity rates within Rhode Island will increase as a result of 
the PPA between Deepwater Wind and National Grid, FERC is unlikely to 
assert jurisdiction.  Federal tax credits for wind energy, however, will 
substantially increase the project’s ultimate profitability. 
This section details Deepwater’s state-sponsored journey through the 
legal, legislative, and judicial system of Rhode Island.  It then explains the 
absence of FERC jurisdiction and examines the impact of federal tax 
credits. 
1.  Rhode Island Renewable Energy Law 
Rhode Island’s energy statutes are codified in Title 39 of its General 
Laws, labeled “Public Utilities and Carriers.”31  The section begins by 
declaring that the electricity distribution business is “affected with a public 
interest.”32  The statute then delegates the supervision and regulation of 
intrastate energy services to the PUC,33 a “quasi-judicial tribunal”34 tasked 
with implementing and enforcing Rhode Island energy law.  The PUC also 
provides an administrative forum for aggrieved parties seeking judicial 
review of its actions and decisions.35  The Commission is composed of 
three electors selected based on experience in law, government, energy 
matters, and other relevant fields.36  The Commissioners are appointed by 
the governor (pending approval by the state senate) and serve six-year 
terms.37 
Historically, Rhode Island’s energy policy was focused on protecting 
consumers by “promot[ing] availability of adequate, efficient and 
economical energy . . . [with] just and reasonable rates.”38  The PUC was 
                                                                                                                          
29 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-3(a) (Supp. 2012) (requiring electric distribution companies to 
contract with renewable energy developers); id. § 39-26.1-7(a) (specifically authorizing Deepwater’s 
PPA and delineating specific facets of the Block Island Wind Farm as requiring approval by the PUC); 
id. § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv) (broadening the definition of “commercially reasonable”). 
30 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006). 
31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39 (2006). 
32 Id. § 39-1-1(a)(1). 
33 Id. § 39-1-1(c). 
34 Id. § 39-1-3(a). 
35 Id. § 39-1-1(c). 
36 Id. § 39-1-4(a). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. § 39-1-1(b). 
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specifically charged with “protecting . . . the public against improper and 
unreasonable rates, tolls and charges.”39  As recently as 2006, Rhode Island 
legislatively declared that “the state’s economy and the health and general 
welfare of the people of Rhode Island benefit when energy supplies are 
reliable and least-cost.”40 
But this pure economic calculus has recently been subverted by Rhode 
Island’s new focus on renewable energy development.  In 2004, Rhode 
Island codified new legislative findings encouraging the development of 
renewable energy sources.41  Beginning in 2007, electricity distributors 
were statutorily required to obtain an annually increasing percentage of 
their energy from renewable energy resources,42 including wind.43  The 
PUC was thus faced with the challenge of promulgating new renewable 
energy standards within a regulatory scheme originally devised to lower 
consumer costs. 
Predictably, difficulties arose when renewable energy proved to be far 
more expensive than the natural gas on which Rhode Island has almost 
exclusively depended.44  When state officials first decided to partner with 
Deepwater to build a wind farm, Andrew Dzykewicz, Governor Carcieri’s 
chief energy adviser and leader of the negotiations,45 stated that Deepwater 
would sell electricity at between seven and nine cents per kilowatt-hour 
(kWh).46  But when it came time to negotiate the first PPA, National Grid 
calculated the cost of Deepwater’s wind energy at 30.7 cents/kWh, more 
than three times the 9.2 cents/kWh it was paying for electricity from other 
sources.47  The final agreed-upon amount was 24.4 cents/kWh, with an 
escalator clause that would increase this price by 3.5% annually over the 
twenty-year contract.48  This would culminate in a final price of 46.9 
cents/kWh, with an average price of 34.5 cents/kWh over the lifetime of 
the PPA. 
                                                                                                                          
39 Id. § 39-1-1(c). 
40 Id. § 39-1-1(e)(3). 
41 Id. § 39-26-1. 
42 Id. § 39-26-4; see id. § 39-26-2(16) (Supp. 2012) (defining “obligated entity” to include electric 
utility distribution companies). 
43 Id. § 39-26-5(a)(2) (Supp 2012). 
44 In 2009, 97% of Rhode Island’s electric power generation came from natural gas.  Fuel Sources 
for Electric Power Generation in My State: Rhode Island in 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Nov. 9, 
2012), http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/electricity_generation.cfm/state=RI. 
45 Ted Nesi, Carcieri Energy Adviser Dzykewicz Resigns, PROVIDENCE BUS. NEWS (July 21, 
2009), http://www.pbn.com/Carcieri-energy-adviser-Dzykewicz-resigns,43686. 
46 Barmann, N.J. Firm Picked, supra note 7.  Mr. Dzykewicz also erroneously predicted that the 
project would not require the passage of any new legislation.  Id.  He resigned from his position in 
August 2009 to pursue other opportunities.  Nesi, supra note 45. 
47 Alex Kuffner, National Grid Says Price of Wind Power Is Too High, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 17, 
2009, at 1. 
48 In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 491–92 (R.I. 2011). 
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This PPA was rejected by the PUC on March 30, 2010.49  The PUC 
applied the then-existing statutory definition of “commercially reasonable” 
and concluded that the PPA did not meet this standard.50  The Commission 
used a two-prong analysis in which it (1) compared the pricing of the PPA 
with other renewable energy projects, and (2) compared Deepwater’s 
expected internal rate of return (“IRR”) “with what an experienced power 
analyst would expect from other renewable energy projects.”51  The 
Commission found that the PPA failed both of these tests.52 
The first prong of the analysis required the PUC to determine the range 
of projects to consider in evaluating the reasonableness of the PPA pricing 
structure.53  In doing so, the Commission refused to adopt the “self 
referent” interpretation of “commercially reasonable” advocated by 
Deepwater, which would require an exceedingly narrow (and obviously 
useless) comparison between the Block Island Wind Farm and projects that 
were identical “in nearly every facet, from . . . size, . . . location and even 
the benefits [rendered] to Block Island.”54  Instead, the Commission 
decided that the prices in the PPA should be compared to the cost of both 
other proposed and existing offshore wind farms and the cost of other 
statutorily defined renewable energy sources.55  In making this comparison, 
the PUC found “that Deepwater’s pricing was clearly higher than any 
technology except [photovoltaic] solar.”56 
In the second prong of the analysis, the Commission evaluated the rate 
of return expected to accrue to Deepwater and its investors.57  In examining 
this issue, the Commission ruled that “the IRR should be sufficient to 
attract investors, but not more than is necessary to secure financing.”58  In 
other words, ratepayers should be subsidizing the project only enough for it 
to be feasible, without providing too generous a profit margin for a 
company that was already enjoying a legally guaranteed market for its 
electricity.  The Commission decided to rely on the testimony of an 
“independent power market analyst” who had “no financial stake in the 
outcome of the matter,” rather than Deepwater’s own financial 
projections.59  Based on this testimony, the PUC found that “the IRR and 
resulting pricing is above that which an experienced power market analyst 
                                                                                                                          
49 Id. at 492–93. 
50 Town of New Shoreham Project, 280 P.U.R.4th 185, 185 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 2, 2010), order 
corrected 2010 WL 2719959 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 5, 2010). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See id. at 213. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 185. 
58 Id. at 214. 
59 Id. 
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would expect to see in transactions involving newly developed renewable 
energy resources.”60  
In reaction to the rejection of the PPA, Governor Carcieri called the 
decision “extraordinarily shortsighted and narrow-minded,” and vowed to 
enlist state legislators in getting the Block Island Wind Farm back on 
track.61   Less than two months after the PUC’s initial rejection of the PPA, 
the Rhode Island General Assembly passed new legislation overtly 
supporting the Wind Farm62 and providing strict new instructions for the 
Commission to follow in reviewing a revised PPA.63 
The new legislation explicitly authorized Deepwater Wind and 
National Grid to enter into a PPA on terms consistent with the previously 
rejected contract.64  The new statute also micromanaged the PUC review 
process so as to effectively strip the Commission of any real discretion in 
reconsidering the PPA.  First, a new expert witness, paid for by Deepwater 
and hired by the Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation, was to 
testify regarding the terms and conditions of the contract.65  Next, the 
statute redefined “commercially reasonable” to “mean terms and pricing 
that are reasonably consistent with what an experienced power market 
analyst would expect to see for a project of a similar size, technology and 
location, and meeting the policy goals in subsection (a).”66  Compared to 
the old definition, which only directed comparison to “transactions 
involving newly developed renewable resources,”67 this new definition not 
only restricted the comparison criteria, it added policy considerations that 
included the ultra-specific local goal of connecting Block Island to the 
mainland power grid.68  Finally, the statute delineated new factors that 
                                                                                                                          
60 Id. at 215. 
61 Alex Kuffner, Proposed Wind Farm off Block Island Remains Stalled, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 9, 
2010, at 3. 
62 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-7(a) (2012) (“The general assembly finds it is in the public interest 
for the state to facilitate the construction of a small-scale offshore wind demonstration project off the 
coast of Block Island, including an undersea transmission cable that interconnects Block Island to the 
mainland . . . .”). 
63 In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 495–97 (R.I. 2011). 
64 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-7(a) (2012). 
65 Id. § 39-26.1-7(b). 
66 Id. § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv).  The listed policy goals were to:  
position the state to take advantage of the economic development benefits of the 
emerging offshore wind industry; promote the development of renewable energy 
sources that increase the nation’s energy independence from foreign sources of 
fossil fuels; reduce the adverse environmental and health impacts of traditional fossil 
fuel energy sources; and provide the Town of New Shoreham with an electrical 
connection to the mainland. 
Id. § 39-26.1-7(a). 
67 Town of New Shoreham Project, 280 P.U.R.4th 185, 185 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 2, 2010), order 
corrected 2010 WL 2719959 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 5, 2010). 
68 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv). 
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would require approval of the PPA, including if it was “likely to . . . further 
development of Quonset Business Park [where Deepwater planned to build 
parts of the turbines],”69 and if “[t]he amended power purchase agreement 
is likely to provide environmental benefits, including the reduction of 
carbon emissions.”70 
The second time around, adjudicating under the new legislation, the 
PUC approved the PPA.71  But even under the seemingly inflexible new 
standards, the PUC was divided.  In addition to the controlling approval 
“by the Commission,”72 the three Commissioners each authored a separate 
opinion, with two concurrences73 and one dissent.74 
The majority opinion, respecting the explicit and specific intent of the 
new legislation, resolved to interpret ambiguities and weigh the evidence 
so as to effectuate the development of the wind farm.75  By applying the 
narrow new statutory definition of “commercially reasonable,” the 
Commission decided that the projected IRR analysis was within the zone 
of reasonableness.76 
The majority diverged in their analyses regarding economic benefits, 
and filed concurring opinions on this issue.77  Chairman Germani and 
Commissioner Roberti disagreed over whether the applicable statutes 
required a net economic benefits test, but noted that their methodologies 
arrived at the same result.78 
Commissioner Bray, however, authored a vigorous dissent, arguing 
that the PPA was still not commercially reasonable, did not include a 
proper price reduction provision, and would not provide economic 
development benefits.79  She rejected the majority’s deference to legislative 
intent, and instead “weighed the evidence and interpreted the law . . . as I 
would in any other case.”80  Commissioner Bray found “absurd” the 
argument that the PUC was statutorily required to look only at the 
economic benefits of the project and not the potential for economic harm.81  
She also took issue with the cost of the wind farm as projected by 
                                                                                                                          
69 Id. § 39-26.1-7(c)(iii). 
70 Id. § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv). 
71 Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett Elec. Co. & Deepwater 
Wind Block Island, No. 4185, 2010 WL 3458306, at *1 (R.I.P.U.C. Aug. 16, 2010). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at *68 (Germani, Comm’r, concurring); id. at *69 (Roberti, Comm’r, concurring). 
74 Id. at *70 (Bray, Comm’r, dissenting). 
75 Id. at *63. 
76 Id. at *64. 
77 Id. at *68 (Germani, Comm’r, concurring); id. at *69 (Roberti, Comm’r, concurring). 
78 Id. at *68–69. 
79 Id. at *70 (Bray, Comm’r, dissenting). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at *71 (Bray, Comm’r, dissenting). 
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Deepwater for the purposes of the cost-savings provision,82 arguing that 
Deepwater undervalued the figure in order to retain profits if savings were 
achieved in the actual cost of the project.83  Finally, Commissioner Bray 
attempted to turn the narrow definition of “commercially reasonable” 
against Deepwater by challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented, opining that “the proponents of the Amended PPA failed to 
meet their burden of proof as to commercial reasonableness on terms and 
pricing.”84 
Three remarkably different interested parties attempted to challenge 
the PUC’s approval of the amended PPA by filing petitions for certiorari 
with the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.85  Toray and Polytop, two Rhode 
Island plastics manufacturers, continued their fight against electricity hikes 
that would result from the PPA.86  Attorney General Patrick Lynch, a vocal 
opponent against the project,87 also filed a petition, though it was later 
withdrawn by his successor, Peter Kilmartin.88  The final petitioner for 
certiorari was the Conservation Law Foundation (“CLF”), which, though 
in favor of “renewable energy done right,” took the position that the 
amended law created “an unlevel playing field that would make it 
impossible for developers to compete successfully for future projects.”89 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island allowed Governor Carcieri to 
intervene on behalf of Deepwater Wind, along with the Rhode Island 
Senate President and the Speaker of the House.90  The court denied 
standing to CLF to continue their appeal, declining to permit the 
Foundation to remain in the case based on a theory of “substantial public 
interest,” and leaving Toray and Polytop as the proverbial “last man 
                                                                                                                          
82 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 39-26.1-7(e)(i)–(ii). 
83 Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett Elec. Co. & Deepwater 
Wind Block Island, 2010 WL 3458306 at *74 (Bray, Comm’r, dissenting). 
84 Id. at *75 (Bray, Comm’r, dissenting). 
85 Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 503 (R.I. 2011). 
86 See Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett Elec. Co. & 
Deepwater Wind Block Island, 2010 WL 3458306, at *5  (identifying Toray as a manufacturer using 
160 million kWh per year and facing an expected rate increase of $287,000, and Polytop as a 
manufacturer using 17 million kWh per year and facing an expected rate increase of $42,000). 
87 In his last official act as attorney general, Patrick Lynch sent out a letter to local nonprofit 
organizations to rally opposition to the wind farm, “calling it an inside deal pushed by . . . Governor 
Carcieri” that would “force . . . families and businesses . . . to buy grossly overpriced electricity for the 
next 20 years to specifically guarantee one company’s revenues and profits.”  Tracy Breton, Outgoing 
Lynch Urges Groups to Fight Wind Farm Project, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 4, 2011, at 5. 
88 Alex Kuffner, Kilmartin Drops Appeal over Proposed Offshore Wind Farm, PROVIDENCE J., 
Feb. 5, 2011, at 3. 
89 CLF Statement on PUC Ruling on Deepwater Wind/National Grid Power Purchase Agreement, 
CONSERVATION LAW FOUND. (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.clf.org/newsroom/clf-statement-on-puc-
ruling-on-deepwater-windnational-grid-power-purchase-agreement/. 
90 In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 503. 
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standing” in the litigation.91  As petitioners seeking to overturn the PUC 
decision, the manufacturers bore a difficult burden before the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court, which had to defer to the Commission’s discretion unless 
it “exceeded its authority or acted illegally, arbitrarily, or unreasonably.”92 
Toray and Polytop first contended that the Commission was overly 
deferential in approving the PPA, and thus essentially “rubber stamp[ed]” 
the contract by abdicating their proper reviewing authority.93  Unconvinced 
by this argument, the court held that the PUC did not err in varying their 
normal standard of review according to the amended legislation.94 
The petitioner’s “most strident objection” centered on the transmission 
cable that would connect Block Island with the mainland power grid.95  
They argued that the intent of the amended legislation mandated that the 
PPA require construction and maintenance of the transmission cable, 
which the 2010 version did not, even though the (rejected) 2009 version 
did contain this affirmative obligation.96  Subsequently, petitioners argued 
that this particular modification of the contract was illegal under the 
statute, and that the 2010 PPA was not “commercially reasonable” since it 
failed to incorporate costs for the cable.97 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island disagreed, holding that the 
amended legislation did not require the PPA to provide for a transmission 
cable,98 and thereby defeating the central premise of the petitioner’s cable-
based argument.  The court was also unpersuaded by the petitioner’s 
arguments concerning the statute’s policy goal of stabilizing long-term 
energy prices,99 providing economic development benefits,100 and 
providing environmental benefits.101 
The court concluded with a rhetorical flourish, by first expressing 
some “trepidation” about “the General Assembly’s unwavering quest to 
sink this demonstration wind farm into the sediment of Rhode Island’s 
                                                                                                                          
91 Id. 
92 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-5-3 (2006). 
93 In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 507.  This argument 
closely echoed a main point of contention in Commissioner Bray’s dissent.  Id. 
94 Id. at 508. 
95 Id. at 508−09. 
96 Id. at 509. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See id. at 514−15 (“[I]t was not necessary for the commission, or the 2010 PPA, to speak 
directly to this [general policy goal].”). 
100 See id. at 526 (“[B]ecause the commission was not required to use a net-benefit test and 
because the commission properly afforded substantial deference to the EDC advisory opinion, which 
assessed economic benefits of $129 million, we agree that the commission did not err in finding that 
the 2010 PPA met the requirements of § 39–26.1–7(c)(iii).”). 
101 See id. at 526 (“The approval of the 2010 PPA creates the likelihood that the environmental 
benefits that DEM attributed to the cable will be fulfilled.  As such, the commission did not err . . . .”). 
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continental shelf.”102  In affirming the PUC’s decision, the court reiterated 
its deferential standard of review and the specificity of the revised 
statute.103  Finally, it expressed “fervent hope” that the Legislature’s 
“William Seward-esque policy decision . . . proves as lucrative and 
majestic as the Alaska Purchase of 1867.”104 
Toray Plastics mounted one last challenge by filing an objection to the 
mutual waiver to a termination clause in the contract between Deepwater 
and National Grid that had been sent to the Commission on September 29, 
2011.105   According to Toray’s interpretation, the clause meant that if the 
amended PPA had not received Commission approval (including the 
resolution of any appeals) by June 30, 2011, then the PPA would 
automatically terminate unless the parties had previously agreed to 
mutually waive this term of the agreement.106  Since the Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island had handed down its decision one day later, on July 1, Toray 
argued that the PPA was not actually in effect, and therefore the parties’ 
ability to waive the termination clause had expired.107  Moreover, because 
the PUC had completed its task in reviewing the PPA, it no longer had any 
authority to approve a waiver of the termination clause.108 
The Commission predictably disagreed, asserting that it had continuing 
jurisdiction over the PPA in order to aid the legislative purpose of 
establishing the Block Island Wind Farm.109  The Commission then 
approved the waiver of the termination clause, finding “no public policy 
reason to interfere” with the intention of Deepwater and National Grid to 
continue operating under the amended agreement.110 
2.  Federal Wind Energy Law 
Like Rhode Island at the state level, the federal government has 
provided significant support to the development of wind energy in the 
United States.  The most important support comes in the form of tax 
credits. 
a. Federal Legislation and Tax Credits for Wind Energy 
The Wind Energy Systems Act of 1980111 marked the beginning of 
                                                                                                                          
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 526−27. 
104 Id. at 527. 
105 Narragansett Electric Co. & Deepwater Wind Block Island, 2012 WL 423628, at *1 
(R.I.P.U.C. Jan. 24, 2012). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at *1–2. 
108 Id. at *2. 
109 Id. at *9. 
110 Id. at *10. 
111 Wind Energy Systems Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-345, 94 Stat. 1139 (1980). 
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earnest federal support for wind energy.112  In passing the Act, Congress 
asserted that “it is the proper and appropriate role of the Federal 
Government to undertake research and development, to participate in 
demonstration programs for wind energy systems, and to assist private 
industry, other entities, and the general public in hastening the widespread 
utilization of such systems.”113  The Act authorized the Secretary of Energy 
to encourage the development of wind energy technology through grants, 
loans, and other forms of financial assistance.114 
The Block Island Wind Farm is a privately funded venture backed by 
New York hedge fund D.E. Shaw & Co.115  Though Deepwater Wind has 
not received grants and loans under the Wind Energy Systems Act, it is set 
to receive sizable federal tax credits.  The Energy Policy Act of 1992116 
first introduced a renewable electricity production credit,117 which was 
extended through 2012 by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009,118 and most recently extended for one more year as part of the 
“fiscal cliff” budget deal passed on January 1, 2013.119  Under the tax 
scheme, Deepwater would choose between taking a Production Tax Credit 
of 2.2 cents/kWh produced,120 or an up-front Investment Tax Credit 
(“ITC”) equal to thirty percent of the Block Island Wind Farm’s 
development expenditures.121  CEO Jeff Grybowski indicated that 
Deepwater would choose the ITC in order to secure up-front financing for 
the project.122 
b.  Federal Energy Regulation:  No Concurrent Jurisdiction 
Energy regulation is handled either at the state or federal level, but not 
                                                                                                                          
112 4 MARY SCARBROUGH & REUVEN HOCH, WEST’S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE  
§ 4650 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2012). 
113 42 U.S.C. § 9201(a)(8) (2006). 
114 Id. § 9205(c). 
115 Ted Nesi, Deepwater Wind’s Key Backer Hits Skids, WPRI.COM (Sept. 29, 2010, 4:13 PM), 
http://www.wpri.com/dpp/money/business_news/deepwater-winds-key-backer-hits-skids. 
116 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). 
117 SCARBROUGH & HOCH, supra note 112. 
118 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1101, 123 Stat 115, 
319 (2009); Christopher Riti, Comment, Three Sheets to the Wind: The Renewable Energy Production 
Tax Credit, Congressional Political Posturing, and an Unsustainable Energy Policy, 27 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 783, 805 (2010). 
119 Stephanie Turaj, Wind Tax Credits Extended, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Jan. 11, 2013), 
http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/wind-tax-credits-extended/945113. 
120 The renewable energy production credit is 1.5 cents per kWh, adjusted for inflation and 
rounded to the nearest multiple of 0.1 cent.  26 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)–(b) (2006).  In 2012, the IRS listed the 
credit as 2.2 cents per kWh.  I.R.S. Notice 2012-35, 2012 I.R.B. 937, 940 (May 21, 2012). 
121 See Mitchell Ward, The PTC and Wind Energy: Restructuring the Production Tax Credit as a 
More Effective Incentive, 11 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 455, 473 (2011) (“A taxpayer may now 
irrevocably elect to take an Investment Tax Credit (ITC) in lieu of the [Production Tax Credit] for wind 
facilities . . . limited to thirty percent of the property’s basis . . . .”). 
122 Turaj, supra note 119. 
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concurrently.123  The Federal Power Act authorizes the FERC to regulate 
the sale of electricity in interstate commerce, leaving jurisdiction over 
intrastate matters to individual states.124 
The PUC assumed jurisdiction for regulating the PPA between 
Deepwater and National Grid, and this jurisdiction was not challenged 
during the proceedings that culminated in the 2011 Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island decision.125  One party, however, has filed a federal 
complaint attempting to argue for federal jurisdiction over the PPA.  
Benjamin Riggs, a longtime opponent of the project, filed a complaint with 
FERC arguing in part that the Block Island Wind Farm’s “electricity will 
be fed into the New England grid and presumably be sold in interstate 
commerce.”126  The complaint then argues that under applicable federal 
law, the rates charged in the PPA are not “just and reasonable.”127 
Riggs’s jurisdictional presumption is likely based on the fact that 
National Grid distributes electricity outside of Rhode Island, specifically to 
New York and Massachusetts.128  But two factors make it highly unlikely 
that power from the Block Island Wind Farm will actually be transmitted 
out of Rhode Island.  First, the demonstration-scale project will produce 
only a small fraction of Rhode Island’s energy needs; there is certainly no 
need to transmit excess power to neighboring states.  Second, Rhode Island 
took some of the sting out of requiring National Grid to buy above-market 
renewable energy by authorizing “financial remuneration and incentives” 
that allow the electricity purchased from Deepwater to be marked up by 
2.75%.129  This state-legislated utility increase is paid by Rhode Island 
ratepayers, and there would be no way for National Grid to collect this 
remuneration from out-of-state electricity consumers. 
Regardless of where the electricity actually flows, it is highly unlikely 
that FERC would attempt to assert federal jurisdiction after three years of 
state litigation.  FERC recently issued a “notice of intent not to act” on 
Riggs’s petition.130   While this notice contains no reasoning for the 
inaction, it can be inferred that FERC thought that the federal energy 
                                                                                                                          
123 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (“Federal [electric energy] regulation . . . extend[s] only to those 
matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.”). 
124 16 U.S.C. § 791a, 824(a) (2006). 
125 See In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 486–503 (R.I. 2011) 
(recapping the case’s procedural and factual background, with no mention of a jurisdictional 
challenge). 
126 Complaint at 3, Riggs v. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. EL 12-100 (F.E.R.C. Aug. 22, 2012). 
127 Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2006) (requiring that all rates and charges be “just and 
reasonable”). 
128 NATIONAL GRID, https://www1.nationalgridus.com/CorporateHub (last visited Feb. 7, 2013). 
129 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-4 (Supp. 2012); Alex Kuffner, Utility to Buy Wind Farm’s 
Electricity, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 10, 2009, at 1 (“[A] 2.75-percent markup on electricity generated 
from renewable sources . . . is allowed by state law.”). 
130 Riggs, 141 FERC ¶ 61033 (Oct. 18, 2012). 
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claims were jurisdictionally baseless and not worth adjudicating.   
The FERC notice does allow Mr. Riggs to bring an action in federal 
court,131 which would be a more sensible place to address his separate 
argument that Rhode Island has violated the dormant Commerce Clause by 
statutorily favoring one in-state renewable energy source.132  This part of 
Riggs’s original FERC complaint incorporates arguments made by 
TransCanada (a rival renewable energy developer) on the application of the 
Commerce Clause in the First Circuit.133 
The TransCanada/Benjamin Riggs dormant Commerce Clause 
arguments are theoretically sound but attenuated by the multistep 
application of the allegedly unconstitutional statute, and by the 
overstretching of prior judicial holdings to accommodate this application.  
The practical application of the modified Long-Term Contracting Standard 
for Renewable Energy134 is unquestionably to facilitate the development 
and commercial success of one particular wind energy project by one 
particular in-state company.  That application, however, depends on the 
interaction of the renewable energy standard that requires electricity 
distributors to purchase a certain percentage of energy from renewable 
sources, and the separate legislation giving explicit direction to the PUC in 
approving the PPA between Deepwater and National Grid.135  More 
specifically, Section 39-26.1-7 requires National Grid to buy power from 
Deepwater that counts “as part of the minimum long-term contract 
capacity,”136 allegedly to the detriment of out-of-state renewable energy 
producers seeking their own slice of that required percentage.137 
This argument is flawed because even though the law creates a 
statutorily-required renewable energy market and then helps one Rhode 
Island company within that market, out-of-state renewable energy 
companies are still not necessarily excluded from selling electricity in 
Rhode Island.  Therefore, the law falls short of paralleling Wyoming v. 
Oklahoma,138 in which the Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma law 
requiring its coal-fired power plants to purchase at least 10% of their coal 
from local sources.139  Moreover, even if the law were found to be 
discriminatory, the policy goal of connecting Block Island to the mainland 
                                                                                                                          
131 Id. 
132 Complaint at 4, Riggs v. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. EL 12-100 (F.E.R.C. Aug. 22, 2012). 
133 See id. at 2, 4 (describing TransCanada’s Commerce Clause argument).  
134 R.I. GEN LAWS § 39-26.1 (Supp. 2012). 
135 See supra Part III.A.1. 
136 R.I. GEN LAWS § 39-26.1-7(h) (Supp. 2012).  
137 See Motion to Dismiss for TransCanada at 4, Riggs v. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. EL 12-100 
(F.E.R.C. Aug. 22, 2012) (“Thus the Subsection 7 PPA (if it is approved) will reduce the volume that 
may be won by any other generators seeking to compete for long-term contracts pursuant to the LTC 
Statute.”). 
138 502 U.S. 437 (1992). 
139 Id. at 455, 461. 
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power grid could potentially qualify as a “legitimate local purpose” 
without practical “non-discriminatory alternatives” sufficient to satisfy 
constitutionality.140  The cost of the undersea transmission cable is 
prohibitive without the incentive of the Wind Farm, the Wind Farm cannot 
be financed without the PPA, and the PPA would not have been approved 
without the revised legislation. 
Of course, the federal lawsuit has not even been filed yet, so it is 
somewhat premature to evaluate the strength of the case before a complaint 
is available for review.  Still, it appears that Mr. Riggs faces an uphill 
battle in continuing to pursue these constitutional arguments. 
B.  Environmental Regulations 
Although the Block Island Wind Farm is intrinsically a clean energy 
project predicted to have positive environmental effects,141 it is still subject 
to myriad federal and state environmental regulations and permitting 
procedures.  At the state level, Deepwater Wind has benefited from official 
state sponsorship in navigating the regulatory process.142  Therefore, 
significant resistance from state environmental agencies is unlikely.  At the 
federal level, however, government agencies making decisions affecting 
the project must follow specific permitting processes under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which requires public notice of proposed 
rulemaking followed by opportunities for public comment and 
participation.143  
1.  Rhode Island Environmental Law 
Two state agencies have significant regulatory authority over the Block 
Island Wind Farm: the Coastal Resources Management Council 
(“CRMC”), and the Department of Environmental Management (“DEM”).  
The CRMC issues work permits within Rhode Island’s coastal zone,144 
which Deepwater will need in order to construct a wind farm and 
transmission cable within state waters.  The DEM is primarily concerned 
with the local environmental effects of the project, including water 
                                                                                                                          
140 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2010). 
141 The RIPUC unanimously concluded that, at the very least, carbon emissions would be reduced 
by eliminating Block Island’s reliance on diesel generators except as a backup in case of a cable 
outage.  In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 526 (R.I. 2011). 
142 See Chris Barrett, Deepwater Moves Ahead with Wind Farm, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Jan. 26, 
2009), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Deepwater-moves-ahead-with-wind-farm-Five-
to-eight-turbines-would-power-the-entire-island/88890 (“The state . . . will help steer Deepwater 
through a host of state and federal approval processes.”). 
143 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)–(c) (2006). 
144 ABOUT THE CRMC, http://www.crmc.ri.gov/aboutcrmc.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
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pollution and threats to endangered species.145 
a. Coastal Resources Management Council 
The CRMC issues work permits for any work done “in, above, or 
beneath” Rhode Island state waters.146  Though Deepwater’s application is 
still pending,147  CRMC assent is all but guaranteed, given that the original 
Joint Development Agreement (“JDA”) between Deepwater and the state 
requires the state to “use all reasonable efforts within its lawful  
authority . . . to cause CRMC to grant to DWW [Deepwater Wind] upon 
DWW acquiring all necessary permits and approvals . . . and at 
commercially reasonable terms the right to use the submerged lands.”148  
Under the JDA, CRMC is even required to assist and advocate for the 
project with other agencies:  “The CRMC shall make all reasonable efforts 
to expedite the SAMP [Special Area Management Plan] and to obtain all 
associated necessary federal, state, and local government permits and 
approvals.  The State shall advocate on behalf of the Project, where 
appropriate, with Federal Agencies and State Agencies.”149  Assuming the 
CRMC adheres to this contractual language, it would seem that it has no 
real choice in whether to permit the Block Island Wind Farm.  After 
CRMC assents, negotiations can begin for a submerged lands lease at 
“commercially reasonable” terms.150 
Despite the contractual predisposition towards approval, CRMC will 
still need to carefully examine the project in accordance with its statutory 
permitting requirements.  Under Rhode Island law, Deepwater has the 
burden of demonstrating that project will not:  “(i) [s]ignificantly adversely 
affect any shellfish management area as designated by the department of 
environmental management or the marine fisheries council; (ii) [b]e in a 
significant conflict with the marine ecology within or adjacent to the 
state’s territorial waters; or (iii) [s]ignificantly harm or destroy existing 
fishing grounds.”151  Deepwater’s application undoubtedly satisfies the first 
two criteria; the Wind Farm is even located in a designated “Renewable 
Energy Zone” that has been pre-established by the CRMC and specifically 
                                                                                                                          
145 See DEEPWATER WIND, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT/CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIONS PLAN 1-
9 (2012), http://dwwind.com/docs/Environmental%20Report.pdf (listing Rhode Island Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System General Permit for Storm Water Discharge and a consultation under the 
Rhode Island Endangered Species Act as required DEM approvals for the Block Island Wind Farm). 
146 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-6(4)(i) (2007). 
147 Deepwater anticipates CRMC approval in the second quarter of 2013.  DEEPWATER WIND, 
supra note 145, at 8 tbl.1.3-1. 
148 JOINT DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND DEEPWATER 
WIND, RHODE ISLAND, LLC 9 (2009), available at http://www.cfcri.com/Joint_Development_Agreeme
nt_1-2-2009_1.pdf. 
149 Id. 
150 Id.; DEEPWATER WIND, supra note 145, at 1-9. 
151 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-18.1(c) (2007). 
 1476 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1457 
designed to minimize potential impact.152  In regards to fishing, Deepwater 
admitted in its Environmental Report that construction of the project would 
result in “moderate, short-term impacts,” but denied that the effects would 
be “long-term or significant.”153  Additionally, the turbines have been sited 
“to allow access both around and through the Project Area” in order to 
minimize the detriment to marine uses such as fishing.154 
b.  Department of Environmental Management 
The DEM is linked to the project in three ways: wetlands protection, 
the protection of endangered species, and the issuance of permits for storm 
water discharge.  Bringing a cable ashore both on Block Island and in 
Narragansett will impact wetlands, and therefore requires permits from the 
DEM.155  DEM regulations require a permit for any “project or activity 
which may alter any freshwater wetland.”156  In securing these permits, 
Deepwater will be required to avoid and minimize impacts to freshwater 
wetlands, taking into account a number of specifically listed issues.157 
Deepwater has also consulted with the DEM about the impact on 
wildlife; over fifty threatened and endangered species were identified as 
potentially occurring within the project’s vicinity.158  Deepwater proposed 
alternate cable routes and turbine layouts in order to mitigate the impact on 
these species.159  Finally, the actual construction of the Wind Farm and the 
laying of its accompanying cables will require Rhode Island Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System General Permits for Storm Water Discharge 
Associated with Construction Activity.160 
As with the CRMC, project resistance from the DEM is highly 
unlikely.  In fact, the DEM issued an advisory opinion supporting the 
project that was taken into consideration in evaluating the PPA.161  Given 
                                                                                                                          
152 DEEPWATER WIND, supra note 145, at ES-2. 
153 Id. at 4-214 to 4-215. 
154 Id. at 4-214. 
155 See Letter from Robert N. Gagnon, P.E., Chief, Office of Customer and Technical Assistance, 
R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., to Cliff McGuiness, Block Island Power Co. (Jan. 31, 2012), available at 
http://dwwind.com/docs/appendices/Appx-A%20Agency%20Correspondence.pdf (asserting the need 
for a wetlands permit on Block Island Power Company property); DEEPWATER WIND, supra note 145, 
at tbl.1.3-1 (listing Coastal and Freshwater Wetlands Permit under state permits, approvals, and 
consultations). 
156 25-16-24 R.I. CODE R. § 5.01(A) (LexisNexis 2010). 
157 Id. § 10.02(D). 
158 Letter from Clint Plummer, Vice President, Dev., Deepwater Wind Holdings, to Cathy Sparks 
and Christopher Raithel, R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. (Nov. 2, 2009), available at 
http://dwwind.com/docs/appendices/Appx-A%20Agency%20Correspondence.pdf. 
159 Id. 
160 DEEPWATER WIND, supra note 145, at 8 tbl.1.3-1. 
161 Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett Elec. Co. & 
Deepwater Wind Block Island, Docket No. 4185, 2010 WL 3458306, at *38 (R.I.P.U.C. Aug. 16, 
2010). 
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the DEM’s conclusion of “substantive environmental benefits” of the Wind 
Farm,162 it would be inconsistent for them to raise serious objections during 
the permitting process. 
2.  Applicable Federal Environmental Law 
Although Deepwater Wind should have little trouble gaining necessary 
approvals from the DEM and CRMC, the Block Island Wind Farm is also 
subject to federal regulations administered by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (“USACE”) and the Department of Interior Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management.163  These agencies must follow specific protocol in 
issuing the necessary permits, in accordance with both the Administrative 
Procedure Act,164 and the National Environmental Policy Act.165  
Additionally, the federal permitting agencies are required to comply with 
the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (“Magnuson-Stevens”).166  Even with 
the opportunity for public comment, Deepwater is unlikely to encounter 
problems with applicable federal environmental law, given early indicators 
and the relatively narrow jurisdiction of the federal agencies involved. 
a.  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  
The USACE has jurisdiction over the Block Island Wind Farm under  
§ 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act167 and § 404 of the Clean Water Act.168  
The Rivers and Harbors Act gives the USACE jurisdiction over 
obstructions in navigable waters,169 and the Clean Water Act gives them 
jurisdiction over dredging and filling permits,170 which Deepwater will 
need in order to place its turbines on the seabed and run underwater 
transmission cables. 
Deepwater has filed permit applications with the USACE, which 
opened a comment period on October 2, 2012171 and later extended the 
comment period through February 10, 2013.172  The USACE public notice 
lists broad criteria for evaluating the project, calling for a cost-benefit 
                                                                                                                          
162 Id. 
163 DEEPWATER WIND, supra note 145, at 1-6. 
164 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
165 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006). 
166 DEEPWATER WIND, supra note 145, at 1-6 to 1-7. 
167 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006). 
168 Id. § 1344. 
169 Id. § 403. 
170 Id. § 1344. 
171 45 Day Public Notice, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 1 (Sept. 23, 2012), 
http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/Regulatory/Public%20Notices/09/2009-00789.pdf. 
172 Press Release, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Public Comment Period Extended to Feb. 10 on 
Deepwater Wind Proposal to Build Wind Turbines off Block Island Coast (Dec. 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/news/12/2012-127.pdf. 
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analysis that includes all relevant factors, including conservation, 
economics, aesthetics, environmental concerns, navigation, energy needs, 
and the needs and welfare of the people.173  Though this would seem to 
give the USACE almost unlimited discretion in deciding whether to 
approve the project, it will in all likelihood only scrutinize the 
environmental and navigational aspects of the Wind Farm, in accordance 
with its original statutory jurisdiction. 
In deciding whether to issue a permit, the USACE must evaluate 
specific environmental effects of the project to ensure that it complies with 
the ESA174 and Magnuson-Stevens.175  The District Engineer has made a 
preliminary determination that neither the wind farm nor the transmission 
cable is likely to adversely affect endangered species or have a substantial 
adverse effect on fish and invertebrate species, though further consultation 
with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries 
Service will be conducted before the USACE issues its final decision.176  
Regarding fish and invertebrate habitat degradation, the Public Notice 
explained that Deepwater Wind minimized impacts by siting the turbines 
and cables “to avoid direct impacts to important habitats such as eelgrass 
and hard bottom substrates known to be used by some species.”177  
USACE Project Manager Michael Elliott said at the outset of the 
permitting process that he did not “see any big deal breakers.”178  In 
addition, the USACE recently approved Cape Wind, another wind farm 
project off the coast of Cape Cod.179  These indicators suggest that 
Deepwater will not encounter significant opposition from the USACE. 
b.  Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) is the federal 
agency responsible for offshore renewable energy programs.180  In order to 
run a transmission cable through federal waters, Deepwater Wind must 
                                                                                                                          
173 45 Day Public Notice, supra note 171, at 4. 
174 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006) (“Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the 
assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . 
is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or 
result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species . . . .”). 
175 Id. § 1855(b)(2) (“Each Federal agency shall consult with the Secretary with respect to any 
action authorized, funded, or undertaken, or proposed to be authorized, funded, or undertaken, by such 
agency that may adversely affect any essential fish habitat . . . .”). 
176 45 Day Public Notice, supra note 171, at 5. 
177 Id. 
178 Pippa Jack, Comment Period Opens for Deepwater Windfarm, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Oct. 5, 
2012), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/comment-period-opens-for-deepwater-windfarm/904828. 
179 Id. 
180 About BOEM, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., http://www.boem.gov/About-
BOEM/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
 2013] SECOND WIND 1479 
secure a Right-of-Way grant from BOEM.181  As the first step in this 
process, BOEM issued a “Notice of Determination of No Competitive 
Interest,” meaning that no other parties are competing with Deepwater for 
the ROW.182  Deepwater then submitted a General Activities Plan, which 
awaits evaluation by the Bureau.183  BOEM will now cooperate with the 
USACE in the NEPA process and with regard to the ESA and Magnuson-
Stevens,184 obviating the need for a separate and redundant proceeding.  
Future complications with the BOEM are unlikely for Deepwater, given 
their limited mission of ensuring that renewable energy activities “are 
conducted in a safe and environmentally sound manner.”185 
C.  Land Use Regulations 
The foregoing sections discussed federal and state regulation of 
Deepwater Wind’s use of the seabed for its wind farm and transmission 
cables.186  But the Block Island Wind Farm will also require substantial 
terrestrial construction, both on Block Island and in Narragansett, the 
mainland town where the transmission cable is planned to go ashore.  This 
construction must be approved through local land use and zoning 
processes. 
Deepwater’s first inroads into local land use involved the 
implementation of research equipment.  The Southeast Light Foundation 
rented space to Deepwater for a light detecting and ranging system to 
monitor bird patterns, and the Town of New Shoreham rented space on a 
communications tower for equipment to monitor bat activity.187  The local 
Town Council also voted to allow the installation of a temporary 
meteorological tower used to collect wind data.188  The substation that 
would actually distribute electricity, however, required more exhaustive 
review by multiple local land use authorities. 
Rhode Island state law dictates that municipalities establish both a 
planning board189 and a zoning board of review.190  The Town of New 
                                                                                                                          
181 See 30 C.F.R. § 585.300(a) (2012) (“An ROW grant authorizes the holder to install on the 
OCS [Outer Continental Shelf] cables, pipelines, and associated facilities that involve the transportation 
or transmission of electricity or other energy product from renewable energy projects.”). 
182 Notice of Determination of No Competitive Interest, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,092, 47,092 (Aug. 7, 
2012). 
183 DEEPWATER WIND, supra note 145, at 8 tbl.1.3-1. 
184 Notice of Determination of No Competitive Interest, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,092. 
185 30 C.F.R. § 585.101(c) (2012). 
186 See supra Part III.B. 
187 Chris Barrett, Deepwater Seeks Weather Tower Near North Light, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Feb. 
17, 2009), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Deepwater-seeks-weather-tower-near-North-
Light/88936. 
188 Chris Barrett, Council Allows Deepwater MET Tower, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Council-allows-Deepwater-met-tower/88999. 
189 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-22-1 (2009). 
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Shoreham on Block Island has chartered both of these boards in 
accordance with state law,191 along with a state-authorized historic district 
commission.192  The Planning Board issues advisory opinions and 
recommendations on zoning matters.193  The powers and duties of the 
Zoning Board of Review include authorizing variances194 and special-use 
permits,195 and referring matters to the Planning Board or Historic District 
Commission.196 
On Block Island, Deepwater Wind has already received approvals 
from all three local land use boards/commissions for its substation to be 
located on Block Island Power Company property.  First, the Historic 
District Commission issued a favorable advisory opinion, with the 
condition that power lines be buried wherever possible,197 followed by a 
Certificate of Appropriateness for construction.198 
From the Zoning Board of Review, Deepwater needed both 
construction approval and a variance for increased pole height for power 
lines.199  In April 2012, the Zoning Board approved Deepwater’s 
application for construction and conditionally allowed the variance.200  
In addition to approval for the substation, Deepwater secured 
easements from the Town Council for cables and manhole installations, 
along with a work permit for the beach area where it plans to bring a cable 
ashore.201  In exchange for the easements, Deepwater agreed to include 
fiber optics with its cable connection to the mainland,202 along with a 
                                                                                                                          
190 Id. § 45-24-56. 
191 NEW SHOREHAM, R.I., HOME RULE CHARTER art. IX, §§  901, 903 (2010). 
192 Historic district commissions are authorized, but not required.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24.1-3(a) 
(2009). 
193 Id. § 45-22-7(c). 
194 Id. § 45-24-57(1)(iv). 
195 Id. § 45-24-57(1)(v). 
196 Id. § 45-24-57(1)(vi). 
197 Judy Tierney, HDC Approves Deepwater Siting and Massing Plan, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES 
(Feb. 1, 2012), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/hdc-approves-deepwater-siting-and-massing-
plan/201327. 
198 Dan West, Deepwater Gets First Approval with Long Permitting Road Ahead, BLOCK ISLAND 
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2012), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/deepwater-gets-first-approval-with-long-
permitting-road-ahead/219692. 
199 Dan West, Deepwater Faces Tough Questioning by Zoning Board, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES 
(Feb. 4, 2012), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/deepwater-faces-tough-questioning-by-zoning-
board/203933. 
200 The transmission poles were allowed only if a subsequent study found that underground lines 
were not feasible.  Judy Tierney, Zoning Approves Deepwater Substation, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Apr. 
6, 2012), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/zoning-approves-deepwater-substation/804606. 
201 Stephanie Turaj, Fiber Optics Now Part of Deepwater Cable, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (June 24, 
2012), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/fiber-optics-now-part-of-deepwater-cable/842165. 
202 Id.  The fiber optic connection is important to many islanders because the island currently 
relies on slow and unreliable DSL for its Internet service.  Id. 
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reported payment of $350,000.203 
Finally, Deepwater will need approval from the Town of Narragansett 
in order to bring its transmission cable ashore on the mainland side of the 
Block Island Sound.  The company was still negotiating with Narragansett 
for an easement as of January 2013.204 
IV.  POLICY ANALYSIS 
The most remarkable aspect of the Block Island Wind Farm’s legal 
history is the fervor with which Governor Carcieri and the state legislature 
created and altered Rhode Island law in order to accommodate the 
project.205  Governor Carcieri has long been the project’s most vocal 
champion, with rhetoric like “we have the opportunity to once again 
control our economic destiny, to lead the nation in the creation of a new 
industry, and to create hundreds, if not thousands, of good paying jobs for 
Rhode Islanders.”206 
On the other hand, vocal project opponent and former Rhode Island 
Attorney General Patrick Lynch called the Wind Farm “an inside deal 
pushed by . . . Governor Carcieri . . . [that would] force . . . families and 
businesses . . . to buy grossly overpriced electricity for the next 20 years to 
specifically guarantee one company’s revenues and profits.”207 
It will likely take decades before the wisdom or foolishness of the 
Block Island Wind Farm can fully be judged and analyzed.  Whether it 
turns out to be a catalyst for new clean energy development or a state-
sponsored bilking of Rhode Island electricity consumers depends on a 
multitude of long-term economic and governmental factors that are 
difficult to predict before the turbines have even started spinning.  But it is 
possible to at least examine the short-term implications of the project from 
the perspective of different stakeholders.  This section outlines and 
analyzes the most immediate effects of the Block Island Wind Farm for 
both Block Island residents and electricity ratepayers on the Rhode Island 
mainland, before speculating on the long-term implications of the Wind 
Farm as a demonstration project for the viability of offshore wind in the 
                                                                                                                          
203 Tamar Wilner, US Block Island Offshore Project Takes Step Forward, WIND POWER 
MONTHLY (June 29, 2012, 3:17 PM), http://www.windpowermonthly.com/news/rss/1139388/US-
Block-Island-offshore-project-takes-step-forward/. 
204 Betty J. Cotter, Narragansett Wary of Deepwater’s Block Island Cable Connection Plan, 
BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Jan. 26, 2013), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/narragansett-wary-of-
deepwaters-block-island-cable-connection-plan/949407. 
205 See supra Part III.A.1. 
206 Governor Carcieri Commends Deepwater and National Grid for New Power Purchase 
Agreement, DEEPWATER WIND (Jan. 31, 2013), http://dwwind.com/deepwater-news/governor-carcieri-
commends-deepwater-and-national-grid-for-new-power-purchase-agreement. 
207 Tracy Breton, Outgoing Lynch Urges Groups to Fight Wind-Farm Project, PROVIDENCE J., 
Jan. 4, 2011, at 5. 
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United States.  It concludes by reflecting on the complex regulatory 
frameworks entailed in the permitting process, and whether and how this 
system could be improved for future renewable energy projects. 
A.  Block Island Residents 
Depending on personal priorities, Block Island residents and 
homeowners have both the most to gain from the Wind Farm and the most 
to lose.  The primary benefit to Islanders is the anticipated reduction in 
electricity costs by being connected to the mainland power grid.  But 
people on Block Island also stand to incur significant aesthetic harm in the 
obstruction of ocean vistas by spinning wind turbines.  Balancing these 
factors can be a largely subjective exercise, primarily due to the inherent 
difficulty in quantifying aesthetic harms.  Nonetheless, the logical place to 
start is with anticipated electricity savings in order to quantify the primary 
economic benefit. 
Block Island is currently powered by diesel generators supplied by 
truckloads of diesel fuel delivered by ferry.208  As a result, Islanders pay 
some of the highest electricity rates in the nation,209 up to four times more 
expensive than those on the mainland.210  Moreover, island electricity rates 
can be volatile, since they are directly tied to the fluctuating cost of crude 
oil.211 
Deepwater’s transmission cable would plug Block Island into the 
mainland power grid, but Islanders would still have to pay considerably 
more for electricity than consumers on the mainland.212  The island would 
be charged 1.8 times the cost of mainland electricity in order to help pay 
for the cost of the transmission cable.213  Even at this inflated rate, 
however, the local Electric Utility Task Group (“EUTG”) estimated that 
the overall cost of electricity on the island would fall by 40%, dropping 
from 54 cents/kWh at current fuel charges to 31 cents/kWh.214  Typical 
residential customers would save $140 per month, and the Town of New 
Shoreham itself would realize about $120,000 in annual savings on its 
electric bill.215 
                                                                                                                          
208 Alex Kuffner, Ruin the View?, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 7, 2010, at 1. 
209 Judy Benson, Wind Farm Controversy Buffets Tiny Block Island, THE DAY (May 27, 2012, 
12:00 AM), http://www.theday.com/article/20120527/NWS01/305279956/1070. 
210 Alex Kuffner, Block Island Divided over Wind Farm, PROVIDENCE J., July 23, 2010, at 4. 
211 Letter from Elec. Util. Task Grp., to Town Council 3 (Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter EUTG letter], 
available at http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/letter-from-electric-utility-task-group-to-town-
council-re-deepwater/922755 (follow “ACOECommentEUTG” hyperlink). 
212 Id. at 1. 
213 Dan West, Thirty Percent Savings with Wind Farm Cable, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (July 26, 
2010), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/Thirty-percent-savings-with-wind-farm-cable/91252. 
214 EUTG letter, supra note 211, at 1. 
215 Id. at 2. 
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The EUTG also identified three different local environmental benefits 
to plugging into the mainland power grid.216  First is the reduction in 
emissions from obviating the need to burn one million gallons of diesel 
fuel per year.217  Second is the reduction in noise from the diesel 
generators.218  Finally, environmental risks from the constant transport of 
diesel fuel and urea (a chemical used in emission control) would be 
eliminated.219 
The final benefit accruing to Block Island is better telecommunications 
access through a fiber optic connection included with the transmission 
cable.220  Fiber optic internet connections would be a massive upgrade over 
the much-maligned Verizon DSL internet upon which the Island currently 
relies.221 
For Block Island residents and homeowners, these benefits are 
weighed against the aesthetics of adding wind turbines to otherwise 
pristine ocean views.  While aesthetics are inherently difficult to quantify, 
there is a valid concern that the properties overlooking the Wind Farm will 
decline in value.  Since offshore wind is a nascent industry in the United 
States, predicting its effects on real estate is a problematic exercise.  Some 
professional analyses and anecdotal evidence indicate adverse effects on 
property values in proximity to wind farms,222 while other studies found 
the evidence to be deficient.223 
One resident pointed out that if $250 million worth of property with 
views of the Wind Farm (a conservative estimate) declined by 10%, this 
$25 million dollar loss would have to be weighed against electricity 
savings for residential customers.224  But even if a dollar figure like this 
                                                                                                                          
216 Id. at 3. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id.  
220 Turaj, Fiber Optics Now Part of Deepwater Cable, supra note 201. 
221 See id. (“Several members of the public stepped up to voice concerns over Verizon [I]nternet 
speeds, complaining that they continue to get slower.”). 
222 See DO WIND PROJECTS ADVERSELY AFFECT PROXIMATE RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY VALUES?, 
http://www.northnet.org/brvmug/WindPower/RealEstate.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) (listing 
studies and commentary about the adverse effects of wind energy projects on home values). 
223 See BEN HOEN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF WIND POWER PROJECTS ON RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY 
VALUES IN THE UNITED STATES: A MULTI-SITE HEDONIC ANALYSIS, at iii (2009), available at 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-2829e.pdf?loc=interstitialskip (“[N]one of the models uncovers 
conclusive evidence of the existence of any widespread property value impacts that might be present in 
communities surrounding wind energy facilities.”); GEORGE STERZINGER ET AL., THE EFFECT OF WIND 
DEVELOPMENT ON LOCAL PROPERTY VALUES 9 (2003), available at 
http://www.repp.org/articles/static/1/binaries/wind_online_final.pdf (“The results of this analysis of 
property sales . . . suggest that there is no support for the claim that wind development will harm 
property values.”). 
224 Mike Hickey, Letter to the Editor, Windfarm: A Dollar a Day?, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Sept. 
28, 2009), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/Featured-Letter-Windfarm-A-dollar-a-day/89833. 
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could be agreed upon, the cost-benefit analysis still depends largely on the 
individual.  Property values aside, wind farms are not universally 
condemned as eyesores detracting from natural aesthetics; some people 
may even find them attractive reminders of forward-thinking green energy 
production.225  Moreover, the electricity cost savings may be more or less 
important to people based on their economic means; a wealthy person may 
not be persuaded to compromise viewsheds regardless of cost, while 
someone struggling to pay their bills will likely be more grateful for the 
financial relief. 
B.  Mainland Rhode Islanders 
Ultimately, the short-term effects of the Block Island Wind Farm at the 
local level will vary widely between individuals.  But residents and 
businesses in mainland Rhode Island have more uniform interests at stake.  
Unlike people on Block Island, their electricity rates will actually increase 
as a result of the Wind Farm and its PPA.  On the other hand, there is no 
aesthetic obstruction to worry about, as the turbines will not be visible 
from the mainland.  Therefore, for mainland Rhode Islanders, the 
Deepwater Wind debate boils down to weighing more expensive electricity 
against the potential for cleaner energy and economic development. 
In evaluating and rejecting the 2009 version of the PPA, the PUC 
based its decision on an estimate that the energy from the Block Island 
Wind Farm would cost $390 million more over the duration of the twenty-
year contract than traditional market-priced energy.226  A typical residential 
customer would incur a 1.7% increase in their electric bill during the first 
year of the contract;227 assuming electricity usage of 500 kWh per month, 
this would equal $1.35 per month.228  Business and industrial firms using 
much greater amounts of electricity would inevitably be hit harder, which 
is why Rhode Island manufacturing firms Toray Plastics America and 
Polytop Corporation fought so hard against the PPA.  Toray and Polytop 
face expected rate increases of $287,000 and $42,000, respectively.229   
                                                                                                                          
225 See Justin Good, The Aesthetics of Wind Energy, 13 HUMAN ECOLOGY REV. 76, 76 (2006) 
(“Some people are literally mesmerized by wind turbines, as much by the hypnotic motion of the blades 
as by the ecologically-satisfying idea of wind turbines as sources of clean and renewable energy.  
Others are literally repulsed by their industrially-constructed look, and even by their very presence as a 
visual intrusion on the natural amenity of the landscape.”). 
226 In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 493 (R.I. 2011). 
227 Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett Elec. Co. & 
Deepwater Wind Block Island, LLC, Docket No. 4185, 2010 WL 3458306, at *50 (R.I.P.U.C. Aug. 16, 
2010). 
228 Town of New Shoreham Project, 280 P.U.R.4th 185, 190 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 2, 2010), order 
corrected 2010 WL 2719959 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 5, 2010). 
229 Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett Elec. Co. & 
Deepwater Wind Block Island, 2010 WL 3458306, at *5. 
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In exchange for these increased electricity bills, the Block Island Wind 
Farm is meant to provide both environmental and economic benefits.  
Unfortunately, in the short term, these benefits appear to fall well short of 
Governor Carcieri’s lofty expectations.  It is possible that the second-stage, 
larger-scale Deepwater Wind Energy Center could one day deliver much 
greater benefits to Rhode Island, but for now, Rhode Islanders are likely to 
be underwhelmed by the return generated by their marginally increased 
utility bills. 
On the environmental side, wind energy’s cleanliness has always been 
its most salient selling point.  Once the turbines are constructed and 
spinning, the Block Island Wind Farm will not produce pollution or 
greenhouse gas emissions.230  At the state level, the energy produced by the 
Block Island Wind Farm will offset energy that would have otherwise 
come from fossil fuels.  Currently, 97% of Rhode Island’s electric power 
generation comes from natural gas.231  This is significant because natural 
gas is relatively clean burning compared to other fossil fuels, with only 
55% of the carbon content for coal and 70% of that for oil.232  Therefore, 
the actual greenhouse gas offset from the Block Island Wind Farm is 
proportionally lessened in that it will replace natural gas power rather than 
coal or oil.233 
In economic terms, the Block Island Wind Farm has thus far 
dramatically failed to live up to its initial expectations.  In 2009, Governor 
Carcieri claimed that the project would “create a minimum of 800 jobs 
with annual wages of $60 million.”234  But when the PUC examined the 
PPA, they initially rejected it partly on the basis that the Block Island Wind 
Farm would create only thirty-five to fifty temporary jobs and six 
                                                                                                                          
230 The Opportunity, DEEPWATER WIND, http://dwwind.com/about/the-opportunity (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2013). 
231 See Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy in My State: Rhode Island, U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/electricity_generation.cfm/state=RI (last visited Jan. 31, 
2013) (charting fuel sources for electric power generation). 
232 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. OFFICE OF OIL AND GAS, NATURAL GAS 1998: ISSUES AND TRENDS, at 
xvi, 3 (1999), available at http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/natural_g
as_1998_issues_trends/pdf/it98.pdf. 
233 The need to burn diesel fuel to provide power on Block Island will be obviated by the Wind 
Farm, but the Island itself will only use about 10% of the power generated, with the 90% remainder 
being exported to the mainland.  Block Island Wind Farm Fact Sheet, DEEPWATER WIND, 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=27&ved=0CF8QFjAGOBQ&ur
l=http%3A%2F%2Fdwwind.com%2Ffile_download%2F167%2FBIWF%2BFact%2BSheet%2B07011
1.pdf&ei=Cvi8UOiuJLK30gGny4HYBA&usg=AFQjCNEElI6yCqOcPzuE5DHgBmMigIVezA (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
234 Governor Carcieri Hails Deepwater Wind Rhode Island Lease Agreement at Quonset Business 
Park, R.I. ECON. DEV. CORP. (June 30, 2009), http://www.riedc.com/news/2009/06/deep-water-wind-
quonset. 
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permanent ones.235  Moreover, the PUC lamented the potential loss of jobs 
that could accompany a spike in electricity rates: 
It is basic economics to know that the more money a business 
spends on energy, whether it is renewable or fossil based, and 
whether it is produced in Rhode Island or elsewhere, the less 
Rhode Island businesses can spend or invest, and the more 
likely existing jobs will be lost to pay for these higher costs.  
Spending large amounts of ratepayer funds on renewable 
energy development can lead to green jobs at new businesses, 
but one cannot ignore the fact that higher energy costs could 
lead to the loss of regular jobs at existing business as well.236 
In summary, the short-term environmental and economic benefits to 
mainland Rhode Island are underwhelming compared to Governor 
Carcieri’s enthusiastic rhetoric.  In the long run, however, Deepwater may 
have further opportunities to make a much bigger environmental and 
economic impact. 
C.  The Block Island Wind Farm as a Demonstration Project 
In the short term, Block Island is set to benefit economically at the 
subjectively-valued price of compromised ocean views, while mainland 
Rhode Islanders anticipate increased electricity rates for dubious economic 
and environmental benefits.  But, as a demonstration project, the Block 
Island Wind Farm is likely to have much greater longer-term consequences 
by serving as a model for future offshore wind farm development in the 
northeastern United States. 
Deepwater Wind is already planning a “second generation” of offshore 
wind farms, including the Deepwater Wind Energy Center, 150 to 200 
turbines located further offshore, about 15 miles southeast of Block 
Island,237 and the Hudson Canyon Wind Farm, another 200 turbines 35 
miles south of Long Island.238  These much larger projects have the 
potential to displace far more fossil-fuel greenhouse gas emissions than the 
Block Island Wind Farm239 and, because of economies of scale, would 
                                                                                                                          
235 Town of New Shoreham Project, 280 P.U.R.4th 185, 216 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 2, 2010), order 
amended, No. 4111, 2010 WL 2719959 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 5, 2010). 
236 Id. at 217. 
237 Deepwater Wind Energy Center, supra note 1. 
238 Hudson Canyon Wind Farm, DEEPWATER WIND, http://dwwind.com/hudson-canyon/hudson-
canyon-project-overview (last visited Jan. 31, 2013). 
239 See id. (noting that Hudson Canyon will displace more than 1.7 million tons of carbon dioxide 
emissions each year); Deepwater Energy Center, supra note 1 (stating that the Deepwater Wind Energy 
Center will displace more than 1.7 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions each year).  
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produce cheaper electricity.240  If the Block Island Wind Farm is 
successful, Deepwater’s experience with building the Wind Farm and 
navigating federal and state politics and regulations will give it a strong 
competitive advantage,241 and with the utility-scale wind farms could come 
the permanent jobs that have yet to materialize in Rhode Island. 
But the Block Island Wind Farm has policy implications beyond 
serving as a physical model for larger projects.  The most controversial 
aspect of the Wind Farm is how the Rhode Island government has forced 
the project through the regulatory process with official state sponsorship 
and narrowly tailored legislation, and the way this has benefitted one 
particular for-profit company.  A crucial question is whether this should 
serve as a model for other states looking to kick-start renewable energy 
development. 
Based on the rampant controversy and fierce litigation surrounding the 
project, it appears that, at the very least, the project could have been 
conceived and executed much more effectively at the state level.  In 
retrospect, the biggest mistake was in the way Rhode Island sought a 
specific “partner” for wind energy development.242  Instead of assigning 
exclusive rights to one company to develop a wind farm,243 the state could 
have preserved an element of competition by passing strong pro-wind 
energy legislation that could benefit multiple developers.  By preserving a 
competitive marketplace for multiple renewable energy firms, electricity 
distributors would have actual options to choose from, and could select 
their own partners based on price rather than litigating over the 
interpretation of “commercially reasonable.”  Moreover, public sentiment 
would remain more favorable, because even if/when ratepayers ended up 
paying more for electricity, it would seem less like “an inside deal . . . to 
specifically guarantee one company’s revenues and profits.”244 
On the other hand, freer negotiations between multiple developers 
                                                                                                                          
240 Deepwater Wind Submits Plan for Nation’s First Regional Offshore Wind Farm to Supply 
Multiple East Coast States, DEEPWATER WIND, http://dwwind.com/news/deepwater-wind-submits-
plan-for-nation-s-first-regional-offshore-wind-farm-to-supply-multiple-east-coast-states (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2013). 
241 See Scott DiSavino, Deepwater to Build First U.S. Offshore Wind Farm, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-deepwater-wind-idUSBRE8920ZX20121003 
(“‘With Block Island we are gaining real-time information on what it will cost to build the bigger 
project.  That is a huge competitive advantage as we look to transition to the 1,000-MW (Deepwater 
Wind Energy Center) we are hoping to build in federal waters,’ [Deepwater Wind CEO Bill] Moore 
said. . . . ‘There are other companies interested in that federal lease, but we have an advantage because 
of our prior selection by Rhode Island as their preferred developer . . . .’”). 
242 Timothy C. Barmann, Wind Farm Gathers Steam—Rhode Island Seeks Private Partner for 
Project, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 4, 2008, at F1. 
243 Timothy C. Barmann, N.J. Firm Picked to Build State’s Wind Farm, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 25, 
2008, at 1. 
244 Tracy Breton, Outgoing Lynch Urges Groups to Fight Wind-Farm Project, PROVIDENCE J., 
Jan. 4, 2011, at 5. 
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would likely take longer, and projects might be more likely to hit snags in 
the regulatory process without the express support of the state.  But 
ultimately, shifts in energy policy cannot be expected to happen as quickly 
as Governor Carcieri anticipated in Rhode Island.  In its rush to get steel in 
the water, Rhode Island managed to alienate the rate-paying public and 
likely ended up with more expensive energy than if it had acted more 
deliberately. 
D.  Renewable Energy Regulatory Reform 
As a demonstration project in a nascent industry, the Block Island 
Wind Farm will have long-term implications for offshore wind energy in 
the United States.  If this industry emerges as Deepwater expects, state and 
federal regulatory schemes may adapt their own permitting processes in the 
interest of efficiency and precision.  Also, applicants for permits will seek 
out the most cost-effective and efficient ways of securing permits from 
multiple agencies. 
Projects on the scale of the Block Island Wind Farm are always going 
to involve complex permitting processes.  But some of these frameworks 
are already being streamlined and adjusted as they evolve and are applied 
to new projects. 
One example is the USACE and the BOEM combining their NEPA 
process245 and therefore avoiding bureaucratic redundancy.  This type of 
interagency cooperation can even bridge federal and state regulatory 
systems; recently, the USACE extended its commenting deadline in part to 
more closely “coincide with the public notice comment periods of both the 
Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council and the Rhode 
Island Department of Environmental Management.”246  Concurrent 
comment periods involving multiple agencies are a relatively easy way to 
simplify the administrative process and to ensure that all public comments 
are received and considered by all of the agencies involved. 
Future offshore wind projects planned by Deepwater Wind will also be 
simplified by their location; the Deepwater Wind Energy Center247 and the 
Hudson Canyon Wind Farm248 will be located in federal waters, 
eliminating the need for permits from state agencies like the CRMC for the 
turbines themselves.  Instead, these wind farms will be under the 
jurisdiction of the BOEM. 
                                                                                                                          
245 Notice of Determination of No Competitive Interest, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,092, 47,092 (Aug. 7, 
2012). 
246 Press Release, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Public Comment Period Extended to Feb. 10 on 
Deepwater Wind Proposal to Build Wind Turbines off Block Island Coast (Dec. 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/news/12/2012-127.pdf. 
247 Deepwater Wind Energy Center, supra note 1. 
248 Hudson Canyon Wind Farm, supra note 238. 
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The BOEM, formerly the Minerals Management Service, has 
undergone substantial recent reorganization to keep up with development 
of offshore resources.249  The agency has already instituted an initiative to 
facilitate new offshore wind projects by expediting the offshore leasing 
process.  Specifically, BOEM initiated revisions to the offshore leasing 
process by eliminating a redundant step when only one developer 
expresses interest in a lease area.250  This reform was part of Secretary of 
the Interior Ken Salazar’s “Smart from the Start” initiative designed to 
spur “rapid and responsible” wind energy development off the Atlantic 
coast.251  
Deepwater itself has also simplified its permitting process by using one 
comprehensive Environmental Report/Construction and Operations Plan 
that has been submitted to multiple agencies and is available for review on 
Deepwater’s website.252  The report was prepared by Tetra Tech, an 
international provider of environmental and energy consulting services.253  
This report can serve as a model for other companies undertaking 
renewable energy projects—namely, it may be easiest to hire an outside 
consultant to prepare one comprehensive document rather than put together 
separate more narrowly tailored packets of information for submission to 
different agencies. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the long run, Rhode Island’s rocky beginning in renewable energy 
may someday be forgotten if larger-scale wind farms trim the costs and 
create more jobs.  But for now, the Block Island Wind Farm’s 
controversial state-sponsored journey through the legislative and 
regulatory process should serve as a cautionary tale to policymakers in 
other states: by pushing and rushing an otherwise untenable and 
anticompetitive project through the legal and regulatory system, you risk 
alienating your constituencies and raising electricity costs. 
At the federal level, Deepwater Wind is fortunate to be working within 
                                                                                                                          
249 Reorganization of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, 
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, http://www.boemre.gov/ (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2013). 
250 Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation & Enforcement, Fact Sheet: 
Revisions to Offshore Renewable Energy Regulations (2010), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=73318’. 
251 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Launches ‘Smart from the Start’ Initiative to 
Speed Offshore Wind Energy Development off the Atlantic Coast (Nov. 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Launches-Smart-from-the-Start-Initiative-to-Speed-
Offshore-Wind-Energy-Development-off-the-Atlantic-Coast.cfm. 
252 DEEPWATER WIND, supra note 145.  
253 Our Company, TETRA TECH, http://www.tetratech.com/about/our-company.html (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2013). 
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an evolving regulatory framework designed specifically to accommodate 
offshore wind energy development.  While the wisdom of renewable 
energy tax credits can be debated and will impact the take-home 
profitability of such projects, the evolution of the nuts-and-bolts regulatory 
process is a less controversial, more practical companion to the emerging 
industry. 
